

CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
STUDY OF PRACTICAL ETHICS
2018 ANNUAL CONFERENCE



congress 2018
OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Gathering diversities

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ABOUT THE CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICAL ETHICS

History

The Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics (CSSPE) /Société canadienne pour l'étude de l'éthique appliquée (SCEEA) was formed in 1987. It mounts an annual conference at a different Canadian university each year in conjunction with the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences/Congrès des sciences humaines.

The CSSPE/SCEEA is committed to the study of all the major areas of practical ethics (bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, ethics of technology, health care ethics, professional ethics, etc.) as well as to addressing ethical issues and concerns which arise in the humanities, social sciences, sciences, professions, and other areas of activity and learning.

The CSSPE/SCEEA has mounted many interdisciplinary conferences with other societies, groups, and institutions. These include the Queen's Cross-Faculty Ethics Forum, the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, the Canadian Philosophical Association, the Ethics Practitioners Association of Canada, the International Society for the Study of Environmental Ethics, the Canadian Theological Association, the Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values, and others.

Because of its diverse background and interests, the CSSPE/SCEEA attracts members from a wide variety of fields and occupations, including academia, the business community, the professions, and the civil service. Membership is open to anyone interested in practical ethics.

Our Executive

President - Sandra Tomsons, University of Winnipeg

Past President - Philip MacEwen, York University

Vice President - Bruce Morito, Athabasca University

Secretary/Treasurer - Melany Banks, Wilfred Laurier University

Member-at-Large - Kira Tomsons, Dalhousie University

Member-at-Large - Julie Ponesse

Member-at-Large - Owen Thornton, McMaster University

Our 2018 Conference Program Chairs

Dianne Lalonde, Western University

Andrew Molas, York University

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION & GENERAL INFORMATION

To present you must:

- a) be a member of CSSPE
- b) be registered at Congress

To become a member of CSSPE, please fill out the membership form on the [CSSPE website](#) and send it to Kira Tomsons along with payment according to the membership fee schedule on the website. You can send Kira a cheque, use an email transfer if you want to pay now, or you can pay the membership fee at Congress to the person who will be designated to collect fees/issue receipts. For snail mail requests, please send to:

Kira Tomsons
Philosophy Department
Douglas College
PO Box 2503
New Westminster, BC
V3L 5B2

To register for Congress, go to the [Congress website](#). Note that you must pay two sets of fees:

1. the fees for registering for Congress
2. the fees for the association (different from the membership fees). If you are a regular member, the fee is \$35, if you are a student, the fee is \$20.

Simply follow the instructions on the website to register and be sure to pick up the registration package when you arrive at the central registration location.


AGM and Catering: We have catered breaks all morning and in the first and last afternoons. We also cater lunch before the AGM on the second day. As a member, you are more than welcome to join us for the AGM and we welcome your participation. We also usually have really great food! We provide vegetarian options for lunch, but cannot guarantee vegan options, unfortunately.

Child Care: if you require child care during Congress, you can register online on the [Congress website](#).

CONFERENCE LOCATION

Our conference location is Education Building - ED 391.

Below you will find a draft map from Congress. You can view the map on the [Congress website](#).



LEGEND | LÉGENDE

- Congress Hub | Carrefour du Congrès
- Big Thinking lectures | Causeries Voir grand
- Social Zone | Zone d'activités
- Residences for attendees
Résidences pour congressistes
- Bus stop | Arrêt de bus
- 24hr paid parking | Stationnement payant 24h
- Complementary day parking
Stationnement de jour complémentaire
- Accessible parking | Stationnement accessible
- Bike parking | Stationnement vélo

AH	Administration Humanities.....	C4	LI	Language Institute.....	C5
CM	Camplon College.....	C5	LY	Dr. John Archer Library.....	B5
CK	Centre of Kinesiology, Health and Sport.....	C5	PA	Paskaw Tower.....	C5
CL	Classroom Building.....	B4	RI	Reserch and Innovation Centre.....	B5
CW	College West.....	B5	RC	Dr. William Riddell Centre.....	B6
EA	Education Auditorium.....	C6	WA	Wakpá Tower.....	C5
ED	Education Building.....	C5	2R	Two Research Drive Building.....	C6
FN	First Nations University of Canada.....	E4	SR	Saskatchewan Disease Control Laboratory....	B7
GG	Greenhouse Gas Technology Centre.....	C7	6R	Petroleum Technology Research Centre.....	B7
KI	KiSiik Towers.....	C5	10R	The Terrace.....	C7
LB	Laboratory Building.....	B5	ISM	ISM Canada.....	B6
LC	Luther College.....	D5			

PRESENTATION FORMAT AND ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES

Format for Presentations

- a) For single papers, you will have 40 minutes in total to present. We usually encourage papers to be no more than 25 minutes as the discussion is usually quite lively and we like to stay on time.
- b) For panel presentations, the time for all panelists and discussion in total is an hour and a half, and it is encouraged that there be about half an hour for discussion, leaving an hour for the panelists to present.

We have booked A/V equipment so that people can use a data projector but if you are using devices that are not compatible with standard PC equipment (like Mac products) then you will be responsible for any adapters you may require in order to use the projectors. We have a wide variety of preferences for presenting, so some people do not use the projector and some do. There is no 'standard' in that respect.

Accessibility Guidelines for Presenters [from the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy](#)

Prepare to be flexible. Access needs are shifting and fluid, and it may be that even your accessible presentation will need to shift depending on who attends your presentation.

Create a script or detailed outline for your talk and bring copies to distribute. Many people find it hard to follow auditory talks, but this is particularly helpful for those who are deaf and also helps the many people who struggle to process you reading your paper, such as those with traumatic brain injuries and second-language learners. If your talk is not scripted, please provide a detailed outline. If you do not want your work cited without your permission, indicate this on your draft (or collect drafts at the end – the moderator can assist with this).

Make your PowerPoint more accessible. (NOTE: current best practice, as articulated in the 2017 Guidelines posted by PhiloSOPHIA: the Society for Continental Feminism, is to avoid PowerPoint altogether). Avoid flashing images, arguments that rely solely on color, and small print. Use a plain background without any watermark, photo, or design behind the text. Plan to have a backup (such as a handout, or using the board) if your PowerPoint fails or is not accessible to your audience.

Bring versions of all handouts and scripts in large print (17 point or larger).

Large-print copies should be single-sided as they may be held close to the face for viewing.

Consider sharing your paper, script, or slides online. This can be in addition to providing printed drafts.

Speak at a reasonable pace. People read much faster than they typically talk, which is hard for everyone to follow.

Announce the accessibility practices you are using. Before you begin, note that scripts, large print, copies of the PowerPoint, etc., are available. Ask if you can be heard. Have someone distribute handouts rather than having people come forward.

Describe any images you display. This includes participants with low vision and makes your images more purposeful for everyone. Rich auditory descriptions are best prepared in advance, and avoid a bare description merely of what is in the photo – communicate meaning if that is clear and pertinent to those who can see the images.

Use captioned videos. Avoid forcing participants to choose between watching videos or interpreters. Recognize that YouTube automatic captioning is flawed. Resources on captioning YouTube videos is here: <http://ncdae.org/resources/cheatsheets/youtube.php>

Re-voice questions. Re-voice (repeat) the questions so all can hear before answering them.

Avoid wearing scents.

SCHEDULE AT A GLANCE

DAY 1 – SATURDAY, MAY 26			DAY 2 – SUNDAY, MAY 27		DAY 3 – MONDAY, MAY 28	
9:00	No session	9:00	Practical Ethical Issues Regarding Lying Within the Public Sphere (aka Fake-News) Hans Krauch	9:00	No session	
9:40	No session	9:40	Is the Paris Agreement a “noble lie”? Melany Banks	9:40	Opposites Bruce Morito	
10:20	No session	10:20	Trust, ‘Trustless’ Transactions, and Blockchains Will Buschert	10:20	Toward a Nonideal Theory Methodology Susan Dielman	
11:00	Break (15 minutes)	11:00	Break (15 minutes)	11:00	Break (15 minutes)	
11:15	Justifying Moral Partialism in Care Ethics Thomas Randell	11:15	Generosity or Academic Dishonesty?: Why Grade Inflation is Unethical David Collins	11:15	Framing the Appropriation Prize: Free Speech, Epistemic Injustice, and Cultural Appropriation by Dianne Lalonde	
11:55	Lying to Children and the Cultivation of Epistemic Virtue Kira Tomsons	11:55	The Ethics and Practice of Open Access Sarah Gorman	11:55	Lunch (95 minutes)	
12:35	Lunch (95 minutes)	12:35	Lunch (55 minutes)			
		1:30	ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING	1:30	Citizenship, Ability, and Contribution David DeVidi	
2:10	Moral Distress and Nursing Elizabeth Fortier	2:30	Colonialism Revisited: The Global South and the Colonization of Space Resources Dan McArthur	2:10	People with Disability and the concept of “The Other” Timothy Allen	
2:50	Mental Illness, the Self and Cultural differences Laila Khoshkar	3:10	Beyond Assimilation: Chinese Arrivants, Indigenous Hosts, and Settler Colonial Apologies - Angie Wong	2:50	End of the Conference	
3:30	End of Day 1	3:50	Break (10 minutes)			
		4:00	KEYNOTE ADDRESS Aboriginal Rights, health care and reconciliation Sandra Tomsons			

ABSTRACTS

Day One – Saturday May 26, 2018

11:15 AM - *Justifying Moral Partialism in Care Ethics* by Thomas Randell

Moral partialism is the view that we have stronger moral obligations, or more demanding moral responsibilities, toward our particular others. Care theorists are sympathetic to this view. A central focus of care ethics is the moral salience of attending to the needs of our particular others. Attending to the needs of our particular others is sometimes justified even if such an action conflicts with the dictates of impartial and universal principles. Therefore, moral partialism is sometimes justified within the care ethical framework. However, there are surprisingly few convincing justificatory arguments for moral partialism in the care ethical literature.

This paper offers a novel justificatory argument for moral partialism in care ethics. It does so in two steps. First, this paper rejects two oft-cited justifications for moral partialism in care ethics: the two-tiered theory of impartiality (as defended by Marcia Baron and Brian Barry) and a modified version of Robert Goodin's assigned responsibility model of moral obligation (as defended by Daniel Engster, Stephanie Collins, Marilyn Friedman, and Eva Feder Kittay). Second, this paper offers a stronger justificatory argument by integrating Joan Tronto's idea of partiality based on relational responsibilities and Virginia Held's work on caring values. The argument runs as follows. Relations that exemplify caring values are morally worthy. The stronger caring values are exemplified in a relation, the stronger and more demanding responsibilities the individuals in that relation have to each other vis-à-vis upholding such values. Given caring values manifest most strongly in relations with our particular others, we have stronger and more demanding responsibilities to our particular others. Moral partialism is thus justified in care ethics.

11:55 AM - *Lying to Children and the Cultivation of Epistemic Virtue* by Kira Tomsons

While we generally have a presumption in favour of truth telling in our moral repertoire, this presumption seems to be lost when dealing with certain types of issues pertaining to children. Lying to children about certain ontological realities, such as Santa and the Tooth Fairy, require sometimes complex deception. The justification behind such lies appeal to the benefit to children in engaging in imaginative play. Psychologists reassure parents that we are not harming our children when we pretend Santa is real.

But such lies are relatively benign, one might argue. In other contexts, lies of omission to children seem more serious. When children are conceived using donor sperm or eggs, often heterosexual couples do not tell their children that is how they were conceived. Much evidence suggests that this does have ramifications for children later down the road, at least with respect to medical histories, and feelings of betrayal if they find out.

Do we have an obligation to be honest with our children about such things? I will argue that we do, and that the experiences of parents within the gay and lesbian community may be

helpful in framing the sorts of obligations we have with respect to the truth. I am going to lay the framework for an argument that claims treating children with moral respect requires attention to the formation of their beliefs about the world and the cultivation of epistemic virtue.

I conclude that certain practices such as lying about Santa, which are relatively benign in their consequences, and others such as lying about family origins, which are not so benign, are not morally justified.

2:10 PM - *Moral Distress and Nursing* by Elizabeth Fortier

In everyday practice, nurses encounter moral dilemmas that can impact patients' quality of care. A nurse exercising moral agency makes ethical decisions based on core values and moral principles. Moral agency has roots in existential philosophy, it can significantly impact the organizational role of nurses, the healthcare system, and patients. The relationship between a moral agent and the institution in which they practice has been labeled the most challenging moral problem of our century. Moral distress can be triggered by a diminished sense of moral agency. Understanding moral agency in a bureaucratic system like healthcare is necessary to comprehend ethical issues and moral distress experienced by nurses.

This study explored moral agency and moral dilemmas experienced by twelve novice registered nurses (RNs) and eight expert registered nurses. The distinctions between Novice and Expert RNs were based on years of experience. Interviews were conducted and participants recruited using purposive sampling and a modified snowball sampling technique. De Groot's interpretive theoretical approach and thematic content analysis were used to analyze data to discover themes. Findings discuss the differences and similarities between Novice and Expert RNs. The study also suggests RNs strive to be moral agents, but face limitations in exercising moral agency in their profession. This research makes an original contribution to knowledge in the field of healthcare ethics as it is the first study of its kind on moral agency and moral distress among RNs in Canada.

2:50 PM - *Mental Illness, the Self and Cultural differences* by Laila Khoshkar

When we speak of the mentally healthy or mentally ill, we typically refer to the mental wellbeing of an individual, human self. The concept of mental health – and by extension mental disorder – is conceived of according to and as it applies to the individual. As such, different theories of mental health depend on different understandings of the individual, including the egocentric construal that I will critique. In this paper, I consider Western assumptions about the individual human being that are implicit in the DSM definition of mental disorder, and consider the import of these assumptions for non-Western people. To this end, I consider Jerome Wakefield's summarisation of the DSM definition of mental disorder as "harmful dysfunction". I show the problems with this view, namely that it (in consistency with the DSM) does not allow for differing cultural interpretations of the human self. I then explicate Bracken, Giller, and Summerfield's perspective on the dangers of holding non-Western people to Western assumptions about the self, and elucidate these dangers through a consideration of a traditional Inuit conception of the self and the ways in

which it differs from the dominant Canadian colonial view of the human person. I suggest that Canadian psychologists and psychiatrists should not apply the Western concept of the self to individuals from other cultural groups, for an appropriate understanding and treatment of the mental health of Syrian refugees in Canada. I explore an alternative view, namely a culturally sensitive and interdependency-oriented conception of the self, and consider the ways in which such a perspective may inform Canadian policy related to mental health care. Ultimately, I propose three policies that flow from an understanding of the interdependent conception which, if implemented, would help prevent, ameliorate, and remedy mental health difficulties for Syrian and other refugees.

Day Two – Sunday May 27, 2018

9:00 AM - *Practical Ethical Issues Regarding Lying Within the Public Sphere (aka Fake-News)* by Hans Krauch

Ethical consideration regarding various types of mass-lying or deception have been discussed quite thoroughly throughout human history. My approach to describing lying within the public sphere is to begin with a brief understanding of what constitutes ethics – what do we mean we say that ethics is a focus of study that attempts to understand and encourage human activity towards the ‘good.’

From there I plan on doing is discussing both sides of the coin – those great minds of history that deem lying ought never to be committed, and those who support the idea that lying is acceptable under certain circumstances. I will then posit the final point that lying, in all its forms, is a sign of weakness. What I mean by weakness is not a lack of moral character or that lying is itself morally reprehensible. Of course this will be backed up with historical examples. One lies because one is afraid of the implications of the truth being known. If one is afraid then one must be in a position of weakness, therefore lying is an act of self-defense.

This would bring us to the practical implications of lying. If those in a position of power over the masses are caught lying – what are the implications of this? When would an exposed lie prove fatal to one’s reputation? When would it be understood that it is part and parcel of being in a position of power? I will argue that lying to one’s own people may not immediately prove the downfall of one’s reputation and position of power – but that since it is a sign of weakness, it will ultimately erode their source of power (the support of the masses).

9:40 AM - *Is the Paris Agreement a “noble lie”?* by Melany Banks

In Plato’s *Republic* Socrates discusses the “noble lie” – a falsehood used by experts to achieve a worthy end. In the *Republic* the lie takes the form of creation myths that can explain and justify the class structure within the State. While, normally, lies are dangerous, when wielded by the right people, they also have the ability to do great good.

In 2016 the Paris Agreement entered into force, an international treaty designed to coordinate and encourage international efforts to avoid dangerous climate change. This treaty is the result of decades of international discussions about climate change, starting with the 1990 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. During these decades the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has released five reports that summarize hundreds of scientific articles on climate change ensuring that policy-makers have up-to-date information as to the cause and effects of climate change. Yet, despite the fact that the Paris Agreement could be seen as a response to these scientific findings, the language of the treaty does not mirror the scientific findings. Instead, the Paris Agreement characterizes climate change as an “urgent global threat” without addressing the origin of the threat. It seeks to encourage States to join the collective effort to avoid dangerous climate change without

assigning responsibility for past emissions. In an important sense, the Paris Agreement tells us a story, one that does not track the truth of climate change.

In this paper I argue that the fiction that is created in the Paris Agreement is a kind of “noble lie”, and that much like in the *Republic*, it could, arguably, be the story that States need to hear in order to take the actions that they must take to avoid dangerous climate change.

10:20 AM - *Trust, ‘Trustless’ Transactions, and Blockchains* by Will Buschert

Blockchain technologies (including cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum) are, by design, very secure and highly resistant to tampering, but do not depend on any central authority to keep them that way. In fact, blockchains are commonly described by enthusiasts as “trustless.” -- i.e., they can be used to facilitate secure transactions in which the transacting parties do not need to trust (or even personally identify) each other. Yet this raises an at least modestly interesting philosophical question: What does it mean to trust a technology? I argue that technologies like the blockchain can properly be characterized as “trustless,” but that there is also a sense in which this is true of (nearly) all technologies. With respect to theories of interpersonal trust (e.g., Baier, 1986), I argue that blockchains, like most technologies (at least to date), are not sufficiently agent-like for them to qualify as properly trustworthy. This also implies that blockchains are not an instance of what Taddeo and Floridi (2011) term “e-trust,” since, *inter alia*, they are not responsive to the interests of users. The most we can say, for most technologies, is that we judge them to be (or have a belief that they are) reliable. I suggest, however, that blockchain technologies are not simply reliable, but extremely reliable, such that it would be useful to think of them as distinct from other forms of technology where trust is concerned.

11:15 AM - *Generosity or Academic Dishonesty?: Why Grade Inflation is Unethical* by David Collins

It is commonplace for educators to hold grade inflation to be wrong, yet (i) little has been written on it from the perspective of practical ethics – i.e., whether its wrongness is more than a contravention of professional standards but is, in a stronger sense, *unethical* – and, (ii) judging both statistically and anecdotally/from experience, it is commonly practiced at all levels of education currently. While tracing the causes of the phenomenon, or distinguishing between its different forms and investigating how widespread these are, would no doubt be valuable, my aim is to analyze just what is wrong about it, ethically speaking. I end up arguing that grade inflation is a form of academic dishonesty, akin in certain respects to plagiarism, wherein an educator misrepresents a state of affairs to the student whose work she is grading, and to others: school administrators, parents, employers, etc.

To avoid tying my argument to a single ethical framework, I propose the following general principle: if an action is wrong according to the standards of all or most normative ethical approaches, then it is *prima facie* wrong. After giving a working definition of grade inflation, I offer arguments for its ethical wrongness on three currently predominant normative frameworks – Kantian deontology, rule consequentialism, and virtue ethics – with slightly more emphasis on the latter in order to explore the notion of a virtuous educator. The only

normative frameworks on which grade inflation might be thought morally acceptable are versions of act consequentialism and care ethics, but I argue that these versions are misconstrued. I conclude by addressing the question of what, if grade inflation is *ethically* wrong, can be done about it given reasons to think it implicitly encouraged by certain structures within educational institutions that practically constrain efforts to combat it or not to engage in it.

11:55 AM - *The Ethics and Practice of Open Access* by Sarah Gorman

Librarians today spend great amounts of time and money digitizing archives of newspapers and public documents, but struggle to balance values of access and privacy as they do so. Digitized documents are commonly indexed by popular search engines and made widely-searchable, which is beneficial except when these documents reveal sensitive criminal, financial, or medical information as reported in local newspapers or meeting minutes of town halls. When confronted with a moral question of whether to withhold or redact personal information, at the expense of public access, librarians weigh two principles: 1) a utilitarian commitment to provide universal access to information, based on aggregate good for society, and 2) a deontological commitment to hide information, based on the librarians' duties to preserve human dignity and to respond when their help is solicited. These principles are irreconcilable, making efforts to apply ethics to questions about digitization fruitless.

To develop a substantial ethics for open access, librarians must move from applied or professional ethics to practical ethics. To do so, I suggest following the work of Canadian philosopher George Grant in "Philosophy in the Mass Age" and "The Uses of Freedom." Grant argues that a blind focus on technological progress undermines moral understanding. This highlights something about the situation of digitizing librarians, which is that their focus on technology may inhibit moral understanding because it equates the furtherance of human good with the furtherance of technology. To determine an ethics of open access, librarians must not work on resolving case-by-case requests to remove information from the Web, but instead focus on figuring out the justifiable uses and limits of technology for library work. A conversation about whether technology supports or thwarts the purposes of the library would be more practical than another argument about access and privacy.

2:30 PM - *Colonialism Revisited: The Global South and the Colonization of Space Resources* by Dan McArthur

With regards to global relations between nations one very valid complaint has been that the developed nations have placed large burdens on the developing nations through their inequitable exploitation of resources, for example with imposing atmospheric costs with regards climate change and commercial exploitation of the oceans. A common complaint that developing countries level is that they have had less equitable use of such global commons. This has been much discussed in the applied ethics literature with regards to topics like the remediation and prevention of climate change and ocean pollution.

A less discussed commons that will increasingly test the relationships between developed and developing countries are the orbital resources, particularly the geostationary orbit

directly above the equatorial nations. This resource, while large is not infinite. A worrying but foreseeable scenario is that the orbit becomes saturated or damaged before the developing nations can benefit from their own use of it. This possibility has in fact been advanced by the equatorial nations in a number of documents and treaties. The concern is, the orbital commons might become the sight of a new sort of colonialism that once again skews the benefits one way towards the developed countries. This is especially worrying since the 1967 Treaty of the Peaceful Use of Space states that the benefits of the use of space must accrue to all nations. This paper will explore how activities in orbit can proceed without reproducing the exploitative relations while instantiating the intentions of the 1967 treaty. This will be done with the goal of pointing a way toward ethical and mutually fair relations with regard to the sustainable exploitation of global various global commons.

3:10 PM - Beyond Assimilation: Chinese Arrivants, Indigenous Hosts, and Settler Colonial Apologies by Angie Wong

As Canada celebrates its 150th anniversary, a review of the political tactics used to represent the settler state as benevolent is necessary for understanding the complex social formations of the settler/native/arrivant paradigm under Canadian settler colonial governance. Reviewing the 2006 apology to Chinese Canadians, I investigate how the political trend of national performances of apology and forgiveness uphold an insidious hegemony on the settler logic of assimilation/exclusion (Day, 2016). Examining the relationship between apology and hospitality, I ask: how does apology affect the relationship between white settlers, Indigenous peoples, and Chinese arrivants? What are the intentions behind settler apologies to certain communities over others? How does apology affect future social relations? By analyzing the historical conditions of Chinese arrivants to uncover an ethics of forgiveness, I delve into: (1) Derrida's deconstruction of apology and forgiveness in relation to (2) a decolonial explication of Levinasian ethics of dwelling through the words of Coast Salish writer, Lee Maracle. In this ongoing research, it will be shown that alternative ethical relations can arise not only from a rigorous re-thinking of state hegemony, but also from the recovery of ancestral relations between West Coast Indigenous peoples and Chinese arrivants.

Day Three – Monday May 28, 2018

9:40 AM – *Opposites* by Bruce Morito

What if irony is so deeply rooted in the constitution of moral life that our attempts to bring about one set of moral ends – by willing what we take to be morally justified actions – actually brings about opposites of these ends? Questions about the relation between opposites is a longstanding one that can be traced to Platonic thought on the necessity of opposites (for there to be cold that must be hot), or to Hegel and his view of the dialectic between opposites, itself a rational process. In a similar vein, Taoist thought, the theory of yin and yang, tells us about the inevitability of opposites producing one another. The history of ethics and moral theory has paid little attention to this view of how the world works, but as I will describe, it seems it has neglected oppositional relations at great expense to humanity. Although I do not intend to develop a thoroughgoing theory of opposites, here, I want to place my critique of ethics and moral theorizing in the context of the history of theories of opposites to emphasize a point: we are facing multiple and systemic moral failures, in large part because we are failing to understand how “applying” prescriptive moral principles produces the opposite of what is intended. We fail to understand the context in which moral life exists and functions. More precisely, for this paper, I will focus on a kind of hypocrisy that is generated when we prescribe moral principles and rules from an ideal moral world perspective. In some ways, we need, therefore, to re-think prescriptive ethics, such that we place mutual understanding at the core of moral responsibility.

10:20 AM - *Toward a Nonideal Theory Methodology* by Susan Dielman

In “Racial Liberalism” (2008) and *Black Rights, White Wrongs* (2017), Charles W. Mills argues that the liberal social contract tradition’s reliance on ideal theory obscures histories of racial injustice. Mills concludes that liberalism can be saved if we adopt a nonideal-theory approach. Similarly, Bashir Bashir has argued, in “Reconciling Historical Injustices” (2012), that theories of deliberative democracy are unable to meet the demands raised by the historical injustices that shape settler colonial societies. He concludes that we ought to keep deliberative democracy, but it should be complemented by the politics of reconciliation. I interpret these efforts as attempts to complement “the fact of reasonable pluralism” with “the fact of historical injustice.” I argue that, in the same way that liberalism can account for the fact of historical injustice if it is conceived in nonideal-theory terms, so too can deliberative democracy if it is similarly conceived in nonideal-theory terms. Thus, the fact of historical injustice presents us with a compelling reason to move from the methodology of ideal theory to that of nonideal theory.

The central aim of this essay is to begin articulating a positive account of the methodology of nonideal theory. Unsurprisingly, nonideal theorists have defined nonideal theory in negative terms: it is not ideal theory. More specifically, nonideal theorists have argued that their methodology is superior because it *does not* theorize against a background of idealizing assumptions. As a result, it is able – unlike its ideal theory counterpart – to take into account the fact of historical injustice. What I suggest is that examining the commonalities between the use of nonideal theory methodology in the context of debates about justice and the use

of nonideal theory methodology in the context of debates about deliberative democracy provides the requisite starting point for articulating a positive account of nonideal theory itself.

11:15 AM - *Framing the Appropriation Prize: Free Speech, Epistemic Injustice, and Cultural Appropriation* by Dianne Lalonde

The Appropriation Prize – a prize for the piece of writing that best appropriates from a culture that is not the author’s own – was a concept created by Hal Niedzviecki in *Write* magazine. Niedzviecki faced harsh criticism in regard to his endorsement of such a Prize and resigned from his position as editor of *Write*. After, a debate erupted in Canadian media constructed around cultural appropriation and free speech.

This paper investigates the framing of this debate, and discussions around cultural appropriation more broadly, as an issue of free speech. It argues that framing cultural appropriation in free speech is problematic as it does not recognize and attend to the power differentials present in cultural appropriation. Epistemic injustice is one form of social power operative with cultural appropriation. According to Miranda Fricker, epistemic injustice includes the ways in which different social groups are afforded or denied credibility and hermeneutical resources. The central form of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice which occurs when prejudicial ideas devalue an individual’s credibility so that they are ignored, questioned, or silenced. This paper shows how testimonial injustice occurs in cultural appropriation as it is often treated as unworthy of serious investigation or discussion, and individuals are exploited into continually defending and justifying their thoughts that cultural appropriation is harmful.

1:30 PM - *Citizenship, Ability, and Contribution* by David DeVidi

It is not news to philosophers that the relationship between citizenship and disability is complicated. Notoriously, John Rawls simply “put aside the more extreme cases of persons with ... grave disabilities,” holding that while “we have a duty towards all human beings, however severely handicapped,” that duty is not according them status as “fully cooperating members” of society, or citizens. If it is required that parties to a contract possess understanding its provisions, perhaps this unsurprising in social contract views, and Rawls is by no means alone in reaching such conclusions. Moreover, it is cognitive disability that is likeliest to call one’s full citizenship into question.

But the way disability is discussed has changed since Rawls was writing, with advocacy often focusing on social inclusion and enabling people to claim their full citizenship. Perhaps those advocating for “full citizenship” are confused or philosophically naïve, and, perhaps, it is either kindness or fear of political backlash that prevents those who spot the confusion from publicly saying so, but we’d prefer a different resolution.

We are not the first to address the question of membership in the political community with people with disabilities in mind. We argue, though, that the other accounts formulated to include people with disabilities leave out something important, which we call contributing

sociability. We describe some evidence that when people advocate for full citizenship they advocate for status that includes it, and that once it is recognized as a desideratum, one can see that it is implicit in many discussions of justice. We argue that contributing sociability doesn't fit with Rawlsian views, but also doesn't fit with accounts (e.g., Kittay, Nussbaum) designed with people with disabilities in mind. We conclude with some considerations of the implications for existing theories of justice.

2:10 PM - *People with Disability and the concept of "The Other"* by Timothy Allen

A central concept in the philosophy of disability is that of othering. Although the term is widely used in the literature, there is considerable uncertainty as to exactly what it means, and how it relates to more established philosophical notions. This paper explores how it emerged within the context of theories of consciousness, how it came to have its current signification, what its import actually is, and how persons with disabilities are subject to othering in mainstream society.

The concept originates with Fichte, who uses this idea to resolve a problem raised by Kant. The paper traces three stages in the development of the idea: Other, in the purely phenomenological sense (Fichte); Otherer: in the sense of the difference in power or status (Hegel, Buber); Otherest: in the sense of institutionalized stigmatization and discrimination (de Beauvoir).

For Fichte, the "I" achieves self-consciousness only through mutual recognition by another rational consciousness. Hegel adopts this position, with a major modification, and introduces a struggle, and a differential of power, into the dynamic: in the Lord/Bondsman dialectic "each consciousness seeks the death of the other." Buber refines the idea by differentiating two types of experience of the other: as "I-Thou," between beings in their authenticity, and "I-It," in which an individual objectivizes and manipulates the other. De Beauvoir fruitfully develops the idea, basing her account largely on Hegel's and Buber's, and using the terms "Subject" and "Other" for the two consciousnesses: the Subject (male), as the absolute human type, and the Other (female) treated as inferior. This ideology of women's inferiority is created, not natural: "One is not born but becomes a woman." Since it is historical, it is amenable to change.

I suggest the stigmatization of, and discrimination against, PWDs can be fruitfully elucidated in terms of Buber's and de Beauvoir's models.

OTHER BIG THINKERS AT CONGRESS TO CHECK OUT

Saturday, May 26th from 12:10 to 1:15 PM in the Riddell Centre University Theatre (RC-170)

On the front lines: Indigenous women and climate change

Melina Laboucan-Massimo

Lubicon Cree, Indigenous Knowledge & Climate Change Fellow, David Suzuki Foundation

Sunday, May 27th from 12:10 to 1:15 PM in the Riddell Centre University Theatre (RC-170)

Thinking about war

Margaret MacMillan

Professor of History at the University of Toronto, former Warden of St. Antony's College and Professor of International History, University of Oxford

Monday, May 28th from 12:10 to 1:15 PM in the Riddell Centre University Theatre (RC-170)

Diversity and reconciliation

Marie Wilson

Commissioner, 2009-2015, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada

Wednesday, May 30th from 12:10 to 1:15 PM in the Riddell Centre University Theatre (RC-170)

Leadership and sustainable peacebuilding

Alaa Murabit

CEO, Omnis Institute, UN High-Level Commissioner on Health and Economic Growth, and UN Sustainable Development Goal Global Advocate

Thursday, May 31st from 12:10 to 1:15 PM in the Riddell Centre University Theatre (RC-170)

The responsibilities of scholars in public debate: Challenging intuitive ethical considerations

Françoise Baylis

Canada Research Chair in Bioethics and Philosophy at Dalhousie University