The following abstracts were accepted for presentation at the CSSPE 2020 Annual Conference which was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Hope and the Wish to Die
Ariane Bakhtiar

Should we be giving the depressed access to medical assistance in dying (MAiD)? Does that not seem counterintuitive given that suicidality is a central feature of the psychopathology of depression? Even following the legalization and growing acceptance of MAiD for those with incurable and unbearable physiological ailments in Canada, the question of assisted suicide and mental illness remains controversial and provocative. This paper defends the position that allowing MAiD for the mentally ill is justified because some people who experience hopelessness as a result of grievous and irremediable major depressive disorder are competent. However, given that hopelessness is also a notable feature of depression, this project differentiates multiple forms. After all, it could be said that the hopeless, suicidally depressed person is not expressing a genuine wish to die, it is their “depression talking” and, as such, the wish to die ought to be disregarded insofar as it is evidence of compromised decision-making capacity (the medical assessment of capacity determines mental competency needed for MAiD). Thus, an assessor in capacity in MAiD cases should be able to differentiate depressive hopelessness, which is a symptom of depression, from “deliberative hopelessness”, which is a rational response to the verifiable irremediability of an illness causing grievous suffering. In doing so, the assessor can determine that some depressed persons are competent and that their wish to die ought to be considered seriously.

“Home to Fail:” A Struggle Between Autonomy and Beneficence
Christinia Landry

"Home to fail" is an often cited, but little explored phrase used during discharge planning in acute care facilities. These discharge cases often occur when the health care team predicts the otherwise capable/competent patient is not going to be able to care for herself properly. Health care teams must allow the patient to choose to go home even if this means the patient is likely to fail to care for her condition adequately (e.g. take her medication properly or clean her wound). After discharge the patient often returns to hospital after only a few days at home generally sicker and more decompensated than before her initial admission. The notion that health care teams send patients home anticipating their speedy readmittance is, prima facie, ethically troubling. And in fact, such a practice may incite moral distress in some members of the health care team. This phenomenon appears to work against the principle of beneficence and acute care facilities’ commitment to safe discharge planning. However, both beneficence and nonmaleficence stand in stark contrast to patient autonomy – the patient’s right to direct her own care if she is found capable/competent of so doing. In my talk, I will argue that what at first seems to be an ethically troubling practice is in fact morally appropriate if we hold patient autonomy as the highest value in such a health care decision, i.e., where and how one may live. Indeed, moral distress in members of the health care team brought on by patients’ (“bad”) choices should not interfere with patient autonomy. In order to forward my argument, I will use a fictional case to frame my discussion of “home to fail” and unpack the values at stake therein such as patient safety, patient autonomy, beneficence, maintaining trust in the health care relationship, and staff exposure (as moral distress). I will find that although “home to fail” may compromise both a patient’s overall well-being and the moral integrity of some staff, it preserves the patient’s right to self-determination which should always trump beneficence (and nonmaleficence).
Aging Justice
Alex Mayhew

One of the critical insights Venkatapuram articulated in his 2011 work Health Justice was that "to be healthy is a kind of freedom. To be free of impairment and pain." He argues that our health expectations are socially constructed and have changed from time and place but has systematically come under human control. Major health failures such as famines and outbreaks of common diseases like Measles are no longer predominantly the result of random bad luck. Instead, today major health failures are largely the result of social practices.

In Health and Social Justice Prah Ruger states that “justice demands that society should ensure that individuals are capable of avoiding premature death and escapable morbidity.” But what counts as ‘premature’ death? Both Venkatapuram and Prah Ruger avoid the topic of aging, scarcely mentioning the word. What happens when we turn the Health Justice lens to aging?

I submit that the way Society currently treats the elderly is ageist. People born a long time ago are expected to endure a loss of capacity that no other group is. The reason for this is clear, technologically it is beyond our capacity to address this. But instead of acknowledging this as a tragedy, we call it natural and put it out of our mind.

By extending the idea of Health Justice we can see the involuntary deterioration of health and end of life as a social justice issue. Aging is already heavily influenced by human choices and social practices. This is most notable in our increasing longevity. This human control is only going to increase. While achieving a completely just society and perpetual health is likely impossible, the pursuit of these ends is a worthy goal.

“Woof Woof” Robotic Dogs at the Bedside: An Ethics Based Critical Interpretive Literature Review of Animal-Like Socially Assistive Robots
Ellie Wakabayashi

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is being used for elderly care as a possible tool to empower elderly to live more independent lives with better quality of life in an institutionalized setting. Socially Assistive robots (SARs) are viewed as a promising technological development with the potential to mitigate the growing care recipient to caregiver disparity. Specifically, animal-like SARs have been developed for institutionalized elderly. Examples include AIBO- the robotic dog, PARO- the robotic seal, and JustoCat-the robotic cat among others.

Numerous ethical issues and implications of SARs are raised in the academic literature regarding a wide variety of SAR uses. The aim of this critical interpretive review was to identify and analyze ethical themes which have been raised in the literature specific to the use (or potential use) of animal-like SARs in elderly care. Particular attention was placed on the unique dilemmas that face the elderly and their caregivers in institutionalized care.

A literature review search in October 2019 of eight academic databases resulted in the identification of 14 publications. Two ethical categories of universalism and particularism were used to structure some of these identified articles. These normative theories did not reach a consensus and had various competing
points. Interestingly, most articles were largely concerned with deception and who should feel guilt and responsibility for transgressions on individual autonomy. Another major theme was questions centered around how elderly autonomy could be respected while providing them with optional animal-like SARs.

The significance of this critical interpretive review is its discussion on the applied practicability of ethically-sound delivery of elderly care. The unique dynamic between animal-like SAR and institutionalized elderly would benefit from being analyzed to guide further application and guidelines.

Women as Victims of “Misogyny:” Re-centring Marginalization
Xinyi Zhao

The question “What is a woman?” has always been contentious in feminist philosophy. Among various views, there is one kind of divergence between the materialist and the pluralist account about whether a woman should be defined or identified based on her typical female biological features. The former is famously defended by Sally Haslanger (among others) who contends that “woman” (in an ameliorative sense) is the social meaning of the female sex – that it is a sex-based or derived concept. Katherine Jenkins, as one of the pluralists, rejects Haslanger’s view and argues that one can be a woman without the normatively associated sexual features. In this paper, I argue that, contra Jenkins, the inclusion of transwomen, along with other gender minority groups, requires more than acknowledging their internal identity. Rather, I argue that such an inclusion and/or demarginalization demands the recognition of the significant role of “misogyny” which plays in the total denial of their identity. This recognition, I suggest, is what makes Haslanger’s materialist account crucial for establishing the definition of “woman.”

Responding to Acquaintance Rape: Neoliberalism and Epistemic Injustice
Katherine Cooklin

Fricker’s model of hermeneutical injustice focuses primarily on the absence of shared cultural resources, facts or concepts, necessary to adequately identify and make sense of one’s experience. But what about cases where concepts do exist, are codified in law and yet appear to be unavailable as epistemic resources to some? An example of this case type is unacknowledged acquaintance rape. Many women, particularly those who are of college age, experience acts that fully meet the legal definition and concept of rape or assault, and yet they fail to identify their experience as such. Moreover, many who are aware of the legal definition, and do identify acts against another woman as rape fail to acknowledge those same acts as rape when they themselves are the victims of such violence. One question raised is how rape myths widen the gap between the legal and promulgated rule of rape and the concepts used to interpret ones own experiences, and if this constitutes a hermeneutical injustice. I will analyze the role that rape myths play in the uneven distribution of epistemic resources to evaluate if Fricker’s model of hermeneutical injustice can be extended to those cases where interpretive concepts are available to some, but not to others, due to the distortion of widely held myths. I argue that rape myths alone are inadequate to account for the case of unacknowledged rape described. Rather, these myths are bolstered by neoliberal narratives of individual responsibility and risk management. Together they lead to misplaced self blame and undermine women’s ability to render their experience intelligible
as sexual violence, resulting in an epistemic injustice that differs from hermeneutical injustice. I then address ethical responses to this injustice.

References

The Capability Approach and Racialized or Colonized Inequalities
Jay Drydyk

The capability approach is well known for proposing a new ‘currency’ for justice. Amartya Sen has argued (as Marx had argued in the 1870s) that resources such as income and wealth can underestimate inequality simply because people have different needs. Differences in subjective satisfaction can also be misleading because some people have expensive tastes and others reduce their hopes and expectations under the heel of grinding poverty. It is more illuminating to consider inequalities in people’s capabilities for health, thought and expression, social relationships, etc. – in short freedoms to be and do those things that are integral to living well.

However, it seems that inequalities of gender, race, disability, and colonization are not all the same; each kind of inequality has its own distinctive features. As Sally Haslanger shows, what is distinctive about gender inequalities is that they are targeted specifically on people perceived as women. Similarly, following Haslanger and Charles Mills, racial inequalities are specifically targeted on groups identified by their perceived ancestry. I will argue that no generic currency of justice – including respect – can capture this specificity.

What then can the capability approach contribute to antiracist or decolonizing theory and practice? Unlike any ideal theory of justice, the capability approach offers insight into the comparative pace of change. For any capability benchmark that should be achievable throughout a society, capability justice calls for moving those farthest from this benchmark towards it most quickly. This crystallizes the intuition that the slow pace of change in overcoming inequalities for indigenous and racialized peoples is especially unjust. In this way the capability approach contributes to recognizing at least one small part of the specificity of inequality and oppression for racialized and indigenous people.

Justice and Accountability: What Do They Require in the Indigenous Peoples-Canada Relationship?
Sandra Tomsons

Recently, in speeches and responding to questions about the Ukraine Airline’s plane shot down in Iran, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau frequently promised Canadians generally and family members in particular: “We will not rest until there is justice and accountability.” Canadians agree with their Prime Minister. Canada should seek justice and accountability from Iran. But, what are we promised? What is justice for families of those killed? Whose accountability are we talking about? Has Canada, the nation, suffered injustice? How will Canadians know our justice and accountability concerns are addressed? What does Trudeau promise with these powerful words? What shows us he kept his promises?
Frequently, my Aboriginal rights research has prompted me to ask: Why aren’t Canadian politicians saying to Indigenous peoples: “We will not rest until there is justice and accountability.”? Canada has apologized for some colonial activity. Since 1997, I have listened to Jean Chretien, Paul Martin, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau express various degrees of accountability for past colonial activity and Indians’ present suffering. Confessions and apologies have been accompanied by i) good words (‘nation-to-nation relationship’, ‘justice’, ‘reconciliation’) ii) policies providing new dresses for colonialism iii) actions not even Band-Aiding Indians’ suffering. Canada is sustaining a colonial relationship. Injustices in Canada’s institutional structure remain.

Using the ‘Wet’suwet’en blockade crisis’ as a Case Study, with assistance from Lorraine Mayer, Dale Turner, Paul Chartrand, Sa’ke’j Youngblood Henderson, Leroy Little Bear, John Borrows, Daniel Paul, Justice Sinclair and Arthur Manuel, I provide a sketch of Canada’s weak justice and accountability commitments to Indigenous peoples demonstrating Canada’s failure violates Indigenous peoples rights as individuals and nations.

**Canadian Decolonization: The Path to Indigenous Recognition and Sovereignty**

Sebastian Farkas

How can indigenous communities acquire recognition and the claim to sovereignty they desire within Canadian society? The heinous treatment of indigenous Canadians has been well documented. Residential schools sought to assimilate indigenous peoples by forcing them to forget their culture and adopt the British way of life. Although, thankfully, Canada has progressed and moved away from this horrific past by making efforts to repair the indigenous relationship. Whether it was Stephen Harper delivering a public apology in 2008, the establishment of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or Justin Trudeau’s 2015 campaign promise to establish a genuine “nation-to-nation” approach, Canada has made an effort to repair historical wrongs. Yet, nothing has really changed. Even though Canada’s constitution includes Section 35 which recognizes and affirms indigenous rights in Canada, time and time again Canada fails to adhere to its own laws created to protect and improve indigenous life. Thus, indigenous Canadians continually struggle to be recognized as sovereigns, despite Canada’s rhetoric conveying the contrary. The government of Canada conveys they want to help indigenous Canadians, but their actions convey a different sentiment. By relying on decolonization (framework), this paper will venture to prove that Canada must change their process for adjudicating legal affairs if indigenous peoples are to have their rights respected, guaranteed, and upheld. Specifically, this paper will focus on indigenous land claims as a pivotal area of where Canadian law must decolonize if the state is to genuinely uphold their promise to preserve the rights of indigenous peoples. Decolonization is predicated on “reimagining” the status-quo through the revalorization, recognition, and reestablishment of indigenous culture within Canadian society. Only then will indigenous people have a chance of grasping the recognition and sovereignty (nation-hood) they desire.

**A Critical Phenomenology of the Effects of Racial Discrimination in Shaping Subjectivity**

Ilknur Ozalli
In the “post-racial” climate of our era, critics are diagnosing a turn towards a social order “beyond-race” by pointing out that we are past discrimination based on race. However, racializing practices of dominant social paradigm still determine our conceptions of self and personal activities by influencing “who” or “what” we might imagine ourselves to be. Indeed, structural oppositions between the white and nonwhite individuals continue to be a central factor that shapes social organization within a prejudicial hierarchy—defining relationships (with ourselves and others) and directly determining our place in the broader social order. With this in mind, to supplement a critique of hierarchy and power, I provide a phenomenological explication of how established perceptions of race operate as status regulator for different groups in the social setting. My argument is that our experiences of subjectivity are always racial and formed in crucial ways by the racializing practices of hegemonic forms of “white culture.”

I start by examining the theory of racial constructionism—which argues race is not innate to human existence, but an historically constructed meaning structure created by varying human groups. However, although race is not inherent to human biology, it still imposes real consequences that often cause social discrimination, negative socialization, stereotyping, prejudice, and symbolic violence against marginalized groups. In order to address this racial injustice, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s account of “bodily subjectivity”, I explain how historically developed colonial value codes cast our social identity through ascribing a “nature” to our visible differences. Finally, I criticize how these racializing structures systematically damage our lived experience at the subjective and intersubjective level and consign us into rigid identities that are becoming increasingly hard to break through.

White Ignorance is Not a Disability
Nic Koski

One pressing issue addressed within the philosophy of whiteness is the widespread false beliefs and lack of true beliefs, primarily among whites, when it comes to matters of race and racism. The concept that is most frequently used to name this issue is “white ignorance.” While white ignorance is primarily used to name whites’ false beliefs or lack of true beliefs on matters of race and racism, white ignorance is also frequently described in terms of disability. In this article, I seek to examine and problematize this description of white ignorance. Looking to the philosophy of whiteness with the work of Charles Mills and others, I examine the way white ignorance is described as cognitive dysfunction, blindness, amnesia, delusion, and deafness. I then argue that these descriptions of white ignorance as disability should be retired since they have the dual consequence of promoting white innocence and stereotypes about disabled people. Describing white ignorance as disability works under the assumptions that disabled people do not experience race, and that disability is a bad thing that ought to be avoided. It also conveys an inability for whites to have known better on matters of race and racism which then positions whites as innocent. While naming the issue of white ignorance in order to address the problematic features of whiteness is an important task, the use of disability in describing white ignorance will only get in the way of that task while creating problems of its own.

Integration, Corrective Necessities and Unjust Constraints
Aaron Landau
Elizabeth Anderson argues that racial integration is a necessary condition for correcting some of the unjust disadvantages of African Americans and that integration is an imperative of justice. (1) The second claim is taken to be dependent on the first. It is because we have no way of correcting certain racial injustices other than integration that justice requires it. In this paper, I will defend Anderson’s view that residential and social integration is a corrective necessity and accept that integration could be realized through certain public policies which are feasible, morally permissible, and not too costly. Nevertheless, I will also demonstrate that the necessity of integration and these policies do not imply that any moral agent has a duty to promote integration. Conversely, I will argue that Tommie Shelby does not show that integration is not required to remedy certain racial injustices, that it is not a duty of justice, or that we should benefit black neighborhoods instead. (2) A central reason why both their arguments fail is that they do not sufficiently appreciate how the unjust conduct and dispositions of other agents can affect our requirements of justice by making various policies less likely to mitigate racial injustice than other courses of action in existing circumstances. Hence, they overemphasize the importance of ascertaining whether integration is necessary for corrective justice at the expense of identifying the policy that is most likely to promote racial justice given the unjust recalcitrance of others. In contrast, I will show that whether an agent has a duty to foster integration, the revitalization of black neighborhoods, or black self-segregation depends on which of these policies has the best chance of advancing justice in light of others’ foreseeable wrongs, especially the persistent white resistance that each of these options faces.

References


Intellectual Ethics in the Practice of Environmental Thought: Towards a Critical Posthumanism

Suzanne McCullagh

Some thinkers attempt to get beyond to get beyond liberal humanism’s historical tendencies to racist and sexist exclusions by thinking in terms of posthumanism. This move, however, is subject to a significant critique; some critical race theorists and social justice scholars argue that posthumanist thought homogenizes humanity and undermines the ground upon which claims about political injustice and human rights are made. Many groups continue to struggle to be recognized as fully human; to eschew the category of the human as posthumanist thought appears to do is to erase from view real political struggles for emancipation, recognition, reconciliation, empowerment, and justice. Can posthumanist thought be aligned with critical race theory, postcolonialism and Indigenous thought and action? Or, as a discourse does it simply re-entrench the (false) idea that all humans have the same present and historical relation to the more than human world? To become more critical posthumanist thinking needs to be more attentive to how humans are differently situated in relation to the political discourse and legality. It should do de-colonial work as part of it’s theorizing. In this paper I consider, how, as a settler environmental theorist, I should approach engaging with indigenous political thought and action in my work in such as way as to avoid both essentializing indigenous peoples as
environmentalists and appropriating indigenous knowledge. While posthumanist thought is valuable for providing concepts and ways of thinking that emphasize the affective and material world, posthumanist thinkers need to remember and explicitly acknowledge, that there are non-European and Indigenous theories and practices that also do this and which predate the Euro-American posthumanist tradition. Currently, there are two examples of staging comparative conversations that I am looking at as possible models for ethical intellectual and cross-cultural conduct.

**Care Worker Migration and the Responsibility for Rectifying Injustices**

*Jordan Desmond*

In “Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice,” Lisa Eckenwiler offers a brilliant account of the ongoing care worker migration crisis, identifying the structural injustices that have caused and been created by the crisis, as well as the agents implicated in their manifestation and perpetuation. (1) Further, Eckenwiler offers several recommendations for how we might go about attributing responsibilities to respond to these injustices. In this paper, I take a critical look at Eckenwiler’s approach to attributing responsibility and the extent to which it can be said to satisfy what ought to be considered the aims of moral action. In particular, I identify in Eckenwiler’s account certain ambiguities that, I argue, entail limitations in scope or in motivational capacity that result in less than maximally just outcomes for those who have been harmed by mass care worker migration.

In light of such issues, I attempt to situate Eckenwiler’s position within a framework inspired by the work of Robert Goodin, (2) so as to strengthen the grounds upon which we are able to make attributions of responsibility and expand the scope of implicated agents from whom moral action is demanded. In particular, I argue that we ought to hold agents responsible for moral action by virtue of their capacity for effective response and regardless of their causal relationship to the crisis. The hope is that by doing so, I am able to preserve the strengths of Eckenwiler’s approach to transnational justice while offering a more effective means of responding to the care worker migration crisis. In order to demonstrate this effectiveness, I consider a concrete proposal, articulated by Joan Tronto, (3) for addressing issues of dislocation and exploitation that result from mass care worker migration and argue that my account is more effectively able to carry out such a proposal.

**References**


**The Responsive Diversity Worker**

*Amber Spence*

Often in academia, women and minorities are held to a higher standard in how they present themselves (caring, empathetic), and how they manage the emotions of their colleagues and students. The
emotional labour that has become expected of them is well documented in studies and feminist literature.

In my paper, I expand on Carla Fehr’s ‘epistemic diversity worker’ to better include all women and minorities within the term ‘diversity worker’. Most importantly, I develop a new term to include the emotional labour that is done by diversity workers: Responsive Diversity Work. I summarize Fehr’s view of the epistemic diversity worker in section one, develop a theory of emotional labour in section two, and explain how the responsive diversity worker is, by virtue of the unfair emotional labour that is expected of her, at great risk of developing mental health issues.

I develop a view of emotional labour by investigating the theory proposed by Hochschild and expanded by Nobauer and Koster. Generally, this view regards emotional labour as the work involved in either inciting an emotional state in oneself, or simply behaving as though one feels a certain way that has become expected of them.

The choice to ‘opt out’ of the work involved in emotional labour comes at a cost for the diversity worker, in a way that does not happen to her cis white male counterparts. For the diversity worker, not engaging in emotional labour can entail a halt in professional advancement in the form of poor student evaluations. These evaluations are used in professional contexts to help make a case for or against career advancement. The strain from sustaining this level of emotional management often results in mental health issues, which may help to shed light on the problem of the leaky pipeline.

Policy and Philosophy: Exploring the Theoretical Foundations of Immigration
K.C. Abalos-Orendain

People are compelled to move and they constantly challenge territorial borders. Thus, immigration debates are ever-present in our socio-political realities. More often than not, our understanding of these issues is based solely on economic and political impetus as expressed in national policies, which seek to contain and control the movement of people. However, these policies do not seem to adequately address the challenges of the immigration phenomenon. This study explores the fundamental philosophical frameworks that underlie these immigration questions and will then explain the ethical and tangible implications of these frameworks on nation-states and migrants themselves.

In a sociological study entitled Japan, the United States, and the Philosophical Bases of Immigration Policy, John D. Skrentny, et al posed that the policies of most developed nations may be categorized under three general immigration philosophies. These are: Economic Utilitarianism, Rights Liberalism, and Communitarianism. The study aptly utilized these philosophical categories to frame their sociological analysis. However, it reduced the intricate philosophical contexts of said policies into simplified generalizations.

We delve deeper into these moral and political theories by comparing the philosophical frameworks of migrant-receiving countries and migrant-sending countries. Does one employ one theory but not the other? Is the Philippines strictly Utilitarian based on its economic needs? Are Canadian and US immigration policies always based on liberal philosophies? Going beyond its descriptive aspect, the real
Concern of this research is to study the possible implications of these broadly construed philosophical categories on migrant rights and claims.

Forgiveness as Turning Off Blame’s Lamp
Craig K. Agule

Popular accounts of forgiveness often focus on how forgiveness changes how we feel, eliminates a debt, or ameliorates our relationships. But, for a central sort of ordinary forgiveness, forgiveness is essentially epistemic, marked by shifts in how we perceive and interpret the wrongdoer. In this paper, I defend that epistemic account of forgiveness: forgiveness as turning off blame’s lamp.

In the first section, I lay out the epistemic account of forgiveness. I begin with the epistemic dispositions of blame. Blame functions as a lamp illuminating the wrongdoer, disposing us toward particular evidence and particular interpretations. This lamp view responds to features of us as finite agents, it fits with the other lamps in our social lives, and it explains several otherwise-puzzling features of blame. If blame is akin to a lamp, then forgiveness is turning off that lamp. In forgiving, we no longer use the wrongdoing to epistemically frame the wrongdoer.

In the second section, I argue that understanding forgiveness as turning off blame’s lamp solves a long-standing puzzle about forgiveness, namely how forgiveness can be simultaneously uncompromising, articulate, and elective. Many think that whatever reasons can be given for articulation make forgiveness compulsory. My account avoids this problem. Given the nature of attention and interpretation, what we should attend to and how we should interpret our evidence will be underdetermined by our circumstances. Accordingly, we can appeal to a forgiver’s elective values and projects in articulating forgiveness, and doing so runs afoul of neither of the other constraints on forgiveness. I close my paper by showing how this notion of forgiveness accounts for the relationship between apology and forgiveness, arguing that an apology can give us reason to forgive without mandating forgiveness—exactly what we should want out of an uncompromising, articulate, and elective account of forgiveness.

Open-Mindedness as a Bridge to Overcome Hate
Lauren Bialystok
Matt Ferkany

Open-mindedness (OM) has long been regarded as a central virtue for citizens of free, pluralistic societies. Through it they transcend tribal alliances that threaten liberal justice and overcome habitual forms of racism, xenophobia, or otherwise discriminatory thinking. OM has likewise been endorsed as a virtue of good learners and an aim of education. OM acts as a bridge between teachers and learners, and between people with different worldviews, letting the merits and defects of our ways of thinking come to light.

This ideal has recently come under significant strain. Under conditions of structural injustice, open-minded exchange may be seen as a vice: it may risk amplifying extreme political views and further disempowering the marginalized. Meanwhile social media and “fake news” have made engagement with intellectual alternatives more perilous, and cognitive science research has called into question our potential for true rationality even under the best of circumstances. The ideal of rational citizens
diligently revising their beliefs in accordance with public evidence today seems lofty to the point of quaintness.

We argue, in contrast, that epistemic OM may mark the difference between adherents to hateful ideologies who can, and those who cannot, be persuaded to abandon them. If so, OM is the kind of bridge that can be used to advance social justice, and remains a critical aim of both formal and public education. We evaluate two stark examples of individuals who underwent complete ideological transformation: Derek Black, a former young leader of America’s largest white nationalist organization; and Megan Phelps-Roper, a former media representative of the ultra-fundamentalist Westboro Baptist Church. While their stories have been celebrated as triumphs of human connection, their conversion to more tolerant views cannot be fully explained without reference to the application of intellectual openness. This has implications for how we pursue the challenging practical work of combating organized hate.

Without Anything to Hide: The Wrongness of Privacy Invasion
Devlin Russell

I argue that a theory of privacy as conducive access better explains the wrongness of privacy invasion than the theory of privacy as control. According to the former theory, an individual, S, enjoys privacy with respect to some access to her, @, just in case @ is conducive (in a shared intentional sense) to S’s needs. According to the latter theory, S enjoys privacy with respect to @ just in case S controls @.

Both theories can explain why it is wrong to violate an individual’s privacy, even if that individual has nothing to hide. But the theory of privacy as control has difficulty explaining why many of the privacy intrusions by governments and large corporations online are wrong. The problem is that a privacy intrusion is not the same as a privacy invasion. A privacy invasion is wrong, but to intrude an individual’s privacy — that is, to eliminate the condition of privacy — is not necessarily wrong. As a result, even if it can be established that governments and large corporations are intruding on our privacy, this does not yet show that they are doing anything wrong. And it is difficult to say why it is wrong for democratic governments to control access to our personal information and why it is wrong for large corporations to control access to publicly inferable information or control access we have consented to.

I argue that wrongness is the property of being unjustifiable, and thus it is wrong to intrude on an individual’s privacy when this intrusion is unjustifiable. On the theory of privacy as conducive access, this entails that it is wrong to intrude on an individual’s privacy when it is unjustifiable to have access to her that is not conducive (in a shared intentional sense) to her needs. With this understanding, we can show that such access may exclude or exploit an individual in unjustifiable ways.

Algorithms and the Ethics of Discrimination in the Insurance Context
Patricia Marino
Alysha Kassam
This paper examines fairness and non-discrimination in the age of algorithms and big data, focusing on the insurance context. While it is unethical, and often illegal, to discriminate along lines of race, sex, and other protected classes, modern algorithms frequently incorporate data that correlates with these characteristics, introducing the possibility of discrimination by proxy. For example, car insurance rates may be based on data from credit reports, leading to worse rates for low income people, and by extension racialized people. Data about online behavior could correlate with having a certain genetic make up, leading to increased costs for people with genetic conditions.

Here, we draw on debates over fairness that predate algorithms (as in Heath 2007) to analyze these kinds of proxy discrimination. Crucial to the insurance context is "actuarial fairness" -- in which insurance rates must correlate with actual risk. Some consider actuarial fairness a straightforward instantiation of fairness and common sense, but because it leads to higher rates for those with existing conditions beyond a person's control, others see it as an unfair expansion of discriminatory marketplace values (Jha 2012, Landes 2015). Applying these concepts to proxy discrimination and drawing on legal theory (as in Schwarcz and Prince, forthcoming), we argue that from a normative point of view, the use of algorithms is best understood as exacerbating and highlighting existing tensions in the normativity of insurance -- and capitalism itself -- rather than introducing problems that are conceptually new. In particular, where various intuitive notions of fairness in insurance markets may had roughly overlapping application in the past, these now come apart dramatically. Ultimately, we argue that the use of algorithms brings to our attention tensions inherent in insurance and our social understanding of the values in play in contemporary capitalist exchange.

Bibliography


Addressing Human Insularity: Towards the Recognition of Nonhuman Other
Olusegun Samuel
Moving beyond human insularity requires a conceptual turn. Conceptually, we require a new vision of what counts morally. If we recognise our co-existence with nonhumans and value interdependent relationships we have with them, the flourishing of both humans and nonhumans is an irreducible matter. This turn involves changing how we currently conceive ‘the human’, and enlarging the reach of our duties to include animals, plants, and natural habitats. As such, we need a more nuanced understanding of humanity in the context of our relationships and interdependence with nonhumans. This paper argues that shifting the direction of moral focus to include animals and the natural environment is essential for addressing anthropogenic practices. It is by recognising others that we can develop a sense of commitment to them. Recognition of dependencies involves the realisation that humans are a part of nature. This realisation is critical not only for rethinking the anthropocentric belief that humans are more important than nonhumans are but also provides a strategy for reframing our conception of humanity as a part of the ecological system. A critical point I demonstrate is that we cannot perform obligations to others if we do not recognise them as part of our community at the social level. The point is that recognition is operational when we take their interests, needs, and wellbeing as indispensable at the level of policy formulation and practice.

Wild Animal’s Political Resistance
Dennis Papadopoulos

Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2011) Zoopolis introduced the concept of sovereignty for nonhuman wild animals [or “animal sovereignty”]. This was part of an attempt to develop political categories that could include nonhuman animals in our all too exclusively human, political communities. The liberating principle behind animal sovereignty is that we do not have authority over wild animals. They are not under our power, even when we are aiming to use that power for their welfare. Our governments and corporations do not have the unilateral authority to decide what is in the interest of wild animals. On this reading animal sovereignty starts to look like a kind of anti-sovereignty. We should think of wild animals as-if they were capable of political resistance. Of course, they cannot understand the political bodies that affect them, that regulate industries they live near, that build highways through their territories. So wild animals cannot intend to resist those political bodies. But, their activities still present resistance. When animals collide, sometimes all too literally, with human constructs (buildings, roadways, farms, residential communities); we should take the ensuing conflicts, as-if they were acts of resistance. These acts could be taken as staking a particular claim against human domination, such as a claim to safe passage across a road, or a request for species appropriate ways of communicating danger.

This as-if move is like animal sovereignty insofar as it affirms that humans do not have unilateral authority over wild animals. However, it doesn’t impose a problematic human concept on nonhuman agents. It also doesn’t entrench a division between our territories, our urban and rural communities, set against their “wilderness”. It opens up a space for negotiation, where animal behaviour is listened to in our attempts to ameliorate conflicts between communities of humans and wild animals.
Counterstories, Narrative Repair, and Rewriting the Harmful Stereotypes of Mental Illness

Andrew Molas

In my paper I discuss the role of narrative in guiding our moral response towards supporting persons living with schizophrenia. Drawing on Lindemann’s concept of counterstories and narrative repair, I argue that a narrative ethical approach shifts the stigmatizing attitudes surrounding mental illness towards an attitude of inclusiveness and care. I demonstrate how counterstories repair identities that have been damaged by harmful master narratives that depict persons with schizophrenia in dehumanizing ways and how a narrative ethical approach strengthens relationships of care to support patients in their recovery from mental illness. I begin by introducing the concept of master narratives and discuss how master narratives influence our interactions with others. Master narratives play a key role in the social construction of persons and their identities. But because master narratives are often established and sustained by groups with high social privilege, the problem with master narratives—and, relatedly, stigma and stereotypes—is that they depict persons belonging to marginalized groups in negative and limiting ways, and this imposed identity influences how we perceive and treat members belonging to these marginalized groups. Given how master narratives impose a harmful identity which negatively impacts the lives of persons living with mental illnesses, it is necessary to shift the conversation of how mental illness is viewed and understood. I argue that one way to achieve this aim is through counterstories. Counterstories are stories written from the perspective of a person belonging to a marginalized group. Counterstories resist an oppressive identity and replace it with one that commands moral respect from those belonging to more socially dominant groups. Counterstories repair identities damaged by oppression by altering the oppressors’ perception of the marginalized group and by altering an oppressed person’s perception of herself in virtue of belonging to that group. By replacing the master narrative with a narrative that showcases the person’s strengths and capabilities, counterstories constitute an individual’s identity in an active way. The process of telling one’s story contributes to the restoration of that person’s identity and self-worth. Drawing on numerous autobiographical accounts of persons with schizophrenia, I argue that these narratives are important for the author herself because it provides her with a contextual framework to make sense of her experiences and explore hidden or implicit meaning behind those experiences. Moreover, these narratives can help support other patients by providing hope and the realization that they are not alone in their suffering. But engaging with the narratives of others can help this process as well. I argue that engaging with their narratives in a caring manner humanizes the person and this relational approach to ethics allows caregivers to better understand how their lived experience with schizophrenia impacts their life. Through this direct engagement with the experiences of others, I argue that caregivers can broaden their understanding of mental illness and learn ways to improve the therapeutic options available to better support individuals in their recovery. And through this collaborative approach, the master narrative and the harmful stereotypes of schizophrenia can be rewritten.
Our Attitudes toward Psychopathic Behaviours: Reconceptualizing the “Psychopath”

Corina Lee

The release of the movie Joker (2019) is the main catalyst for this paper, though I have often been interested in the debate of and wondered whether psychopaths ought to be held responsible for their actions, and whether they can be morally blamed. Can we, and do we sympathize with the protagonist, Arthur Fleck? Why does such a seemingly morally condemnable person invoke feelings of sympathy and compassion such that, despite our typical and immediate reaction of repulsion and disgust? How should we conceive of someone like him, and how should we treat them?

I want to argue that yes, we can and we do sympathize with Arthur Fleck and others alike. I argue that someone like Susan Wolf’s Jojo and Joker’s Arthur Fleck are responsible for their actions - not because they could do otherwise, but because they actively choose to do what they do (after some deliberation and evaluation). I examine PF Strawson’s reactive attitudes and try to show how his account fails to provide an adequate account of how we ought to view such individuals (whom I call “psychopaths” for ease of reference). I then use Susan Wolf’s definition of (in)sanity to argue that, contra Wolf, psychopaths are, in fact, sane and thus responsible, and can be correctly held accountable for their psychopathic behaviours and actions. I also draw upon Scanlon’s negative notion of contractarianism and his notion of trusteeship to understand why psychopathic behaviour can be rationalized and accepted by others in the community. I conclude that psychopathic behaviour is not insane and actually understandable if we respect psychopaths as rational agents. I take it that once we understand their behaviours, we can reasonably rationalize why they behaved the way they did, which is in accordance with their values, beliefs, and experience of the world. Conceived in this way, psychopaths are rational agents responsible for their actions, and perhaps it is the case that their actions are condemnable, but it cannot be said that such actions and the individual are blameworthy.

The Collective Harms of Psychiatric Detention

Alex Miller Tate

Debates surrounding the harms and appropriateness of psychiatric detention and compulsory treatment focus on harms to the service users who are detained, or at risk of detention. Though widespread disagreements exist regarding exactly where to draw the line on the appropriateness of detention and involuntary treatment, the central thought is that the harms that require balancing (including potential rights violations, preference violations, and self-inflicted injury) are those that will (or may) accrue to those being considered for detention.

In this paper, I argue that this focus will tend to underestimate and (in part) incorrectly locate the harms involved in the clinical response to service users presenting to primary care in a state of psychological crisis. Deploying Kristie Dotson’s concept of testimonial smothering (2011), I argue that current responses will tend to result in the unjust silencing of all service users, including those who are neither subject to, nor at risk of, detention; a fact necessarily missed by analyses focused exclusively on the rights of, and harms accrued by, those service users at risk of detention. This indicates that more ethical attention should be paid to the atmosphere in which primary psychiatric care operates, rather than merely the permissibility or advisability of detaining individual service users.